

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-271

1 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Clearance Exchanges

1. [REDACTED], Executive Secretary, NFIB, wants me to tell him how [REDACTED] should respond to Donald I. Spiers, Director, INR. Spiers has asked [REDACTED] to have the DCI look into and give full support to establishing arrangements by which clearance exchanges can be expedited. STATINTL

2. I raised this issue recently but put it on the back burner in view of other SECOM priorities.

3. Spiers' request by itself could get high level attention but there are other related issues which has got this pot simmering already. STATINTL

- CIA's insistence on investigating everyone that is assigned to the Agency (example, [REDACTED] from FBI).
- DIA's insistence on investigating [REDACTED] 30 days after retiring from CIA so he could be cleared as a consultant to Gen. Tighe. STATINTL
- State taking 3 - 4 months to investigate a CIAer being assigned to INR.
- [REDACTED] concern that the Community members, don't clearly appreciate the ramifications of a single compartmentation access approval system, including the implications for mutual acceptance of clearances.

State Department review completed

STATINTL

- The Hill's staff study on the suspected unevenness of the Community's BI.
- The [ ] study that demonstrates that there are considerable differences in the way we do clearance business.
- The SCC charge that we come up with common investigative criteria.
- The ongoing DoD study on investigation/clearance procedures.

3. We can sit back and wait for direction from on high or we can do something using the SECOM mechanism to channel tasking the way we want it to go.

STATINTL

4. I propose the latter and suggest we start by giving [ ] advice along the lines in the attached and making sure we follow through on doing what we say we will do.

[ ] STATINTL

Attachments

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-272

1 July 1980

NOTE FOR: Executive Secretary, NFIB

FROM:   
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Clearance Exchanges

REFERENCE: Mr. Spiers' Request that the DCI Expedite  
Clearance Exchange

1. Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

2. Mr. Spiers' observation is already within the sphere of the DCI's attention. While the DCI recognizes and respects departmental responsibility to assure itself of hiring only good people, he is encouraging certain actions in the Intelligence Community related to exchange of security clearances needed for access to intelligence.

3. The DCI's Security Committee, on which the Department of State has active membership has recently completed a study of 5000 cases to analyze the effectiveness of the current background investigation.

4. The Community's security elements are assisting in developing procedures to implement  a DCI initiated and Presidentially approved single system of compartmenting intelligence. Under  it should be easier to certify and accept access approvals throughout the Community.

5. Some departments have streamlined administrative security procedures. And most have begun to make greater use of Automatic Data Processing.

6. Unfortunately, there are no readily available viable solutions perceived that are not resource intensive.

7. The present security community populations are small. Requirements for their use in the expanding physical, technical, personnel protection and antiterrorism fields is highly competitive with the requirement to conduct increasingly thorough security screening of applicants and employees.

8. As movement toward a true Community effort continues and more people are detailed and assigned among agencies, there will be a more ready acceptance of clearance certifications and vouchers among participating agencies.

9. Mr. Spiers' interest is welcomed. His observations have been made available to State security. The DCI's Security Committee will continue its efforts to structure mutually acceptable procedures to expedite the exchange of clearances.



STATINTL

-3293-60



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH  
WASHINGTON

June 2, 1980

STATINTL

Mr. [REDACTED]  
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management  
Community Headquarters Building  
Washington, D. C. 20505

STATINTL

Dear [REDACTED]

During the past year we have made considerable progress in assuring that our positions are filled in a timely manner so that vacancies are held to a minimum. We have been pleased with improvements in the Department of State's system for assigning Foreign Service Officers into INR rotational slots and have developed a relatively smooth system for filling the continuity Civil Service positions that become vacant. A description of our recent performance in filling vacant positions is enclosed.

A principal area of continued concern is lengthy time required for the Department of State's Security Division to process the background investigations of our new hire continuity employees. In particular, we are perplexed by the length of time it takes to process the hire of an individual who is presently employed by another Intelligence Community Component. We understand that there is a similar problem between other intelligence agencies, but we would appreciate having the DCI investigate how such clearances might be expedited. In addition, we have one office, the Office of Politico-Military Analysis, which, because of the specialized expertise often demanded, has been particularly difficult for us to staff during the past year, and in which we have several continuing vacancies. We would appreciate the DCI's support in helping us to arrange details, or rotational assignments from other NFIB agencies to fill those vacancies on a one or two year basis.

Sincerely,

*[Signature]*  
Ronald I. Spiers

Enclosure:  
Memorandum of 5/29/80



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 29, 1980

MEMORANDUM

TO: INR - Mr. Ronald I. Spiers

FROM: INR/EX - Vincent J. Farley *VJF*

SUBJECT: INR Personnel Assignments and New Hire Procedures

Foreign Service rotational positions are filled by Foreign Service Officers who are assigned to INR by the Department's central assignments system. During the fall of 1979 a list of Department and overseas projected Foreign Service vacancies for the summer/fall 1980 cycle was circulated to all FS personnel worldwide. From December on these positions began to be filled after due consideration of the preferences expressed by officers, as well as of the requirements for each position. By early March, 30 of the 3 INR positions scheduled for rotation during this cycle had been taken care of. In April, two of the remaining four positions were filled and we expect to fill the last two positions, which have been recently reprogrammed by INR, within the next few weeks. Although there may be some gaps between the departure of present incumbents and the arrival of their replacements, most of these gaps will be of not more than two to four weeks duration--a normal situation since the Department of State does not have float positions.

INR's continuity positions are filled through the Civil Service Merit Promotion System and, since 1978, new hire employees through Civil Service (GS) outside hire procedures. The Merit Promotion System is used primarily for filling staff vacancies, but also for some officer level vacancies. This process takes a minimum of two months from the date on which a position is vacated and advertised through the GS posting system to the date on which a candidate assumes new position. An additional several weeks or more may be required if a position description must be written or revised and its position level classified. INR fills most of its staff vacancies through this method and, though there are some gaps, these gaps are part of the general government wide GS system.

When INR wishes to hire a new continuity employee at the officer level this matter is normally handled through the Civil Service outside-hire system. Although employees of other U.S. government agencies may bid on INR and other Department of State vacancies, applicants who do not work for the federal government, or who work for exempted agencies, such as CIA, DIA, and NSA, must go through the outside-hire procedures. Until early 1978, the Department of State had used since the late 1960s a Foreign Service Reserve (FSR) and FSR-Unlimited (FSRU) system for hiring such continuity employees; but beginning in early 1978 and particularly since the introduction on the Hill in 1979 of the proposals for major revision of the Foreign Service Act, which is presently being considered by Congress, the Department of State has hired all continuity officer level employees through the GS system.

A position must be carefully written and classified, and then INR must go through the Department's central personnel system to obtain a certification from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). INR management officials met with the responsible OPM officers in May 1979 to discuss speeding up the OPM component of outside-hire requirements, and procedures were established which greatly expedited the process. Since that date, OPM has certified all candidates preferred by INR as qualified for our vacant positions. This process is called "selective certification", and although in theory OPM could also offer other nominees from their registers of all applicants for U.S. Government employment, they have, thus far, certified the perspective employee that INR has identified through its contacts with the academic community, other government agencies, etc.

Since August 1979, INR has initiated the outside-hire of 15 officer level candidates. Seven of these individuals are now INR employees including: GS-14 Geographer; GS-13 Egyptian analyst; GS-13 Lebanese, Jordanian and Israeli analyst; GS-12 analyst for Soviet Relations with Mid-East Maghreb and Africa; GS-11 Western European analyst; GS-9 China Economist; and GS-5 Cartographer. The average time required for the security investigations for these seven employees was approximately four months. In addition there are four other applicants who are in the SY clearance pipeline--two whose security clearances have been in process for five to six months, and two whose clearances began within the past two months. The two clearances that are taking a long time both involve applicants who have had extensive overseas experience, which thus complicates their investigations.

INR has had four individuals for whom we initiated the outside hire process, but who later decided to withdraw their application while the SY clearance was in process. In one of these cases, the applicant decided to accept a permanent job offer from the agency (NASA) where he was already a temporary employee. A

second applicant withdrew, in part, owing to the length of time it was taking to complete his background investigation, but also, in part, owing to the fact that he did not think he could afford to live in the high cost Washington area compared to the low cost of living in the small mid-Western town where he is presently a teacher. In addition, two GS-15 specialists in politico-military affairs, who had applied to fill the Division Chief positions in the Nuclear Arms Control and General Theater Forces Divisions, both declined to continue their applications with INR after their applications had been in process for several months. One of these two applicants decided to stay in a non-career position with another section of the Department of State, and a second accepted an SES offer with his own agency (DOE).

The Office of Politico-Military Analysis (PMA) has been the most difficult INR office to staff because of its requirements for expertise, which is in short supply inside and out of government. The two GS-15 division chief positions are still vacant, but INR hopes to fill one of these through the Department's Merit Promotion System in late June, when a career employee of another section of the Department will be eligible to compete for the position. In addition, a third position in PMA is presently being filled by a detailee who will return to DIA in August; a fourth position will unexpectedly be vacated in mid-July owing to the retirement of a career FSRU employee; and a fifth position will be vacated owing to the one year detail of an INR continuity employee who was elected in late May as Chairman of the Secretary's Open Forum Panel. We would appreciate DCI support for our efforts to arrange the detail of employees of other NFIB agencies to fill PMA vacancies. STAT  
At present, we have made a particularly urgent request to General Tighe to arrange a one year detail for [redacted] STAT  
[redacted] to the position of Acting Chief of the General Purpose and Theater Forces Division.

Because the most lengthy delay in processing an outside hire applicant is in completing the background investigation, INR has worked closely with the Office of Security to prioritize its vacancies and assure that candidates are processed in the most expeditious manner possible. Although the average required time for a security investigation for INR outside-hires has been four months, this record is quite good considering that the average length of time required for the security investigation for a GS clerk-typist has been 14 months, for an FSO-18 months, and for an FS secretary 24 months. Two of the seven outside hires who entered on duty last winter were employees of the CIA and DIA, and although their current employment status facilitated their clearances, it still took three to four months to complete their investigations. We understand that clearances within the Intelligence Community cannot be transferred and each agency must complete its own investigations, but we would appreciate having the DCI look into this issue and give full support to establishing arrangements by which such clearances can be expedited.



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The Department of State's Office of Security has just initiated a program under which employees in some sections of the Department, such as consular services and administrative support, will not require full Top Secret clearances, but will be hired at level of Secret clearances. Although INR has been given an exemption to this rule because all INR employees require full Top Secret clearances, it is hoped that the lessened work load in processing Secret clearances for large numbers of State employees in other bureaus here will help the Office of Security to speed up the time required for all investigations. Not until the fall, when the present backlog of pending investigations will finally be slowly processed, will we know how effective this new hiring procedure will be.

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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		Date
		6/23/80
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. [Redacted]	STATINTL	
2. - DCI Security Committee Room GE31, CIA Hqs.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

## REMARKS

Please lend me your wisdom on how [Redacted] should respond to STATINTL on the attached.

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No. - Bldg.
[Redacted]	5508 STATINTL
	Phone No.
	[Redacted]

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
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